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It is an irony of the American criminal justice
system that while every jurisdiction allows a
defendant to appeal a conviction on a wide
variety of grounds, a sentence which falls
within the prescribed statutory range cannot be
appealed in the federal courts and in most
states. While it is possible for a defendant to
challenge the constitutionality of a severe sen-
tence because it might constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment, the courts will usually not
view a sentence which falls within the statutory
limits as a violation of the eight amendment. In
civil actions resulting in an award of monetary
damages, the award can always be appealed on
grounds that it is either excessive or inade-
quate. But in a criminal case in which the penal-
ties exacted against a defendant are likely to be
far more costly to him than monetary damages,
the trial judge's discretion in formulating the
sentence is unreviewable in most jurisdictions.
This is true even if the defendant has pleaded
guilty, and the severity of the punishment is the
only issue in the case. While serving on the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Mr. Justice
Stewart observed that:
It is an anomaly that a judicial system which has
developed so scrupulous a concern for the pro-
tection of a criminal defendant throughout'ev-
ery other stage of the proceedings against him
should have so neglected this most important
dimension of fundamental justice.'
The United States is among the few countries
which adhere to the rule of non-reviewability of
* Much of the research for this article was made
possible by a grant from the National Endowment for
the Humanities. The author is indebted to David
Fellman for his encouragement and assistance.
Thanks are also due on more general grounds to
David R. Deener.
** Associate Professor of Political Science, Univer-
sity of Southwestern Louisiana; LL.B., Loyola Uni-
versity of the South; Ph.D., Tulane University.
I Shepard v. United States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (6th
Cir. 1958).
sentences. Most European countries consider
the sentence to be a matter of law and, as such,
reviewable. 2 In England, appellate review of
sentences is a well recognized practice, and
from 1907 until 1966 that power was exercised
by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Since 1966,
when the judiciary was reorganized in that
country, the Criminal Division of the Court of
Appeals has regularly heard a steady though
manageable stream of sentence appeals. Like its
predecessor, this court enjoys a strong reputa-
tion for its ability to correct discrepancies in
sentences and, to some extent, to develop poli-
cies for the guidance of lower courts.3
Modern penological thinking has caused in-
creasing concern in legal circles in the United
States for methods of individualizing sentences
so that they can be made to fit the criminal as
well as the crime.4 In the context of this devel-
opment, it was perhaps inevitable that the doc-
trine of non-reviewability of sentences would
eventually be reconsidered, and today this is an
area of the law characterized by change, both
recent and impending. The clearest sign that
the doctrine would soon undergo widespread
reconsideration was the publication in 1968 of a
report of the American Bar Association's Advi-
sory Committee on Sentencing and Review
which advocated the adoption of appellate re-
view of sentences on both the state and federal
levels.5 This report served to publicize the ar-
guments against the doctrine of non-reviewa-
bility of sentences that had been advanced for
2 Mueller & Le Poole, Appellate Review of Legal But
Excessive Sentences; A Comparative Study, 21 VAND. L.
REV. 411, 423 (1968).
3 Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19 §§ 9-11, replac-
ing Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 97, consolidat-
ing Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 4(3)
and Criminal Appeal Act, 1966, c. 31, § 4(2).
4 The case most frequently cited in the evolution of
this development is Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241 (1949).
- ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING AND RE-
VIEW, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW
OF SENTENCES (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STAN-
DARDS].
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years by such critics as Judge Simon E. Sobel-
off, a member of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the chair-
man of the ABA's advisory committee.
Almost immediately after publication of the
ABA's report, appellate review of sentences be-
came a popular topic of research for law review
purposes. In a number of states the idea was
seriously considered, by either legislative orju-
dicial bodies. In Alaska, for example, the prac-
tice was instituted for the first time by legislative
act,6 and in other states, like Missouri and Ten-
nessee, a provision authorizing sentence review
was incorporated in proposed revisions of their
criminal code.7 Perhaps most significantly, a
provision for sentence review was included in
the proposed codification of the federal crimi-
nal laws now pending in Congress.' If Congress
should pass this provision, it will furnish the
states with a highly visible model for appellate
review of sentences.
This research is intended as a necessary first
step to any effort to study the response of the
appellate courts to the opportunity to engage in
penological policy-making and ultimately to as-
sess the ability of a system of sentence review to
realize its promises. It is essentially a descrip-
tion of the current status of appellate review of
sentences in the United States both as an on-
going practice and as an idea for possible adop-
tion. The first part is addressed to the need to
determine the extent to which appellate review
of sentences exists in the United States and to
explain the variations in the practices that are
discernible from state to state. The second part
of the study provides a brief account of the
experience of the federal courts with the doc-
trine of non-review and in this context the prin-
cipal arguments against the practice are sum-
marized. Finally, the functions of the practice
are reviewed and some questions by reference
to which it can be evaluated as a judicial func-
tion are identified.
I.
Table 19 indicates that some form of sentence
review is available to some extent, at least, in
6 ALASKA STAT. §12.55.120 (1973).
7 TENN. CRIM. CODE AND CODE OF CRIM. PRO. (pro-
posed) ch. 24, § 40-2410 (1973); Mo. CRIM. CODE
(proposed) § 2.070 (1973).
S S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3725 (1975).
9 Any attempt to compile an accurate description of
the current status of appellate review of sentences in
twenty-three states. In the remaining states and
in the federal courts a sentence which falls
within the range of punishment prescribed by
the statute is final. Availability of this form of
review cannot be equated with actual use, how-
ever, and various factors severely limit the
practice in some states. The total number of
states listed contrasts with the findings of an-
other survey of this subject conducted in 1962
which found that a total of only fourteen states
permitted appellate review of sentences at that
time.10 In its 1968 study the ABA's Committee
on Sentencing and Review examined twenty-
one states, not all of which are listed in Table
1.11 The relatively rapid increase in the total
number of states in recent years is undoubtedly
a reflection of the increased interest in sentenc-
ing policies in general and in appellate review
of sentences in particular.
In eighteen states the power to review sen-
tences is based on explicit statutory authority. 2
In eight of these states the authority, while
explicit, is usually briefly given within the con-
text of a general grant of appellate power.
3
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, for example,
derives its authority from a statute authorizing
it, among other things, "to affirm, reverse or
modify the order, judgment, or sentence of the
the United States is risky. There is a danger that
findings will almost immediately be rendered inac-
curate by new legislation or judicial decisions. In
addition, it is sometimes difficult for researchers,
judges and practicing attorneys alike to distinguish
between an appeal against sentence on the ground
that it is excessive but not illegal, and an appeal on the
ground that it is illegal because not authorized by
statute or because imposed as the result of unfair
procedure or because it offends the constitutional
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.
Factors like these explain the differences in the find-
ings of this and previous studies. In order to compile
as accurate a description as possible, this survey is
based on both library research and on the results of a
questionnaire circulated by mail to the Attorneys
General in all fifty states, to which 45 responses were
received. See Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate
Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND. L.
REV. 671 (1962); Comment, Appellate Review of Sen-
tences: A Survey, 17 ST. Louis U. L. J. 221 (1972).
0 Mueller, supra note 9, at 671.
"ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 13-66.
12 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee. Citations
to the individual statutes are provided in Table 1.
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trial court."'4 This type of statute is not ad-
dressed exlusively or directly to the review of
sentences and in most cases treats the subject
only cursorily.
In the remaining states the authority to re-
view sentences is given in a statute that ad-
dresses itself elaborately and sometimes exclu-
sively to the subject of sentence review. As a
group, these statutes tend to be of much more
recent date than the others. While not as elabo-
rate as some, the Arizona statute is typical of
those explicity authorizing sentence review. It
provides:
Upon an appeal from the judgment or from the
sentence on the ground that it is excessive, the
court shall have the power to reduce the extent
or duration of the punishment imposed, if, in its
opinion, the conviction is proper, but the pun-
ishment imposed is greater than under the cir-
cumstances of the case ought to be inflicted. In
such a case, the supreme court shall impose any
legal sentence, not more severe than that origi-
nally imposed, which in its opinion is proper.
Such sentences shall be enforced by the court
from which the appeal was taken.' 5
In the five remaining states: New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and
Wisconsin, appellate review of sentences is
based on judicial interpretation of a general
jurisdictional statute.16 It is not unusual for ap-
pellate courts to be empowered by statute to
"affirm, reverse or modify" the judgments
which they review on appeal, and the courts in
such states have found that this sort of authori-
zation is broad enough to serve as a basis for the
power to review sentences on appeal. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court, for example, traces
its authority to review sentences to a statute
which reads in part: "The Appellate Court may
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment ap-
pealed from, if necessary or proper, and may
order a new trial.' 7 The Supreme Court of
Arkansas has held that a similarly general stat-
ute'6 constituted authority to review legally er-
roneous sentences on appeal, but that the Ar-
kansas legislature's attempt to grant the court
1' HAW. REv. STAT. tit. 35 § 641-24 (1968).
1- ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717(B) (1956).
16 Case citations for each state are provided in Ta-
ble 1.
'7 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1066 (West 1958).
18 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2725.2 (Supp. 1975); Ab-
bott v. State, 256 Ark. 558, 508 S.W.2d 733 (1974).
express authority to review legal sentences vio-
lated the state's constitution.1 9
In other instances the courts have found im-
plied authority to review sentences in statutes
that were quite general indeed. In 1963 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that it had
the authority to review sentences for an abuse
of discretion by the trial judge."' That decision
was grounded on a statutory provision describ-
ing the court's discretionary reversal power,
under which the court may direct that a proper
judgment be entered when it appears from the
record that a miscarriage of justice has oc-
curred. 21 Apparently realizing the tenuousness
of its statutory grounds, the court was careful to
stipulate at the time that it would "be a rare case
where the power will be used," 22 and indeed the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has reversed very
few sentences on appeal. It was not until eight
years later, in 1971, that it again reversed a
sentence on the ground that the trial judge had
abused his discretion. 2 The Wisconsin experi-
ence appears to reflect an incipient national
trend among appellate courts to review sen-
tences without explicit statutory authority. 24 In
1961, the appellate division of the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that it had the authority to
modify a sentence without being able to cite any
statutory authority.
25
As might be expected, sentence review tends
to be a less well-established practice in those
states in which the authority to review has been
judicially implied from statute than when sen-
tence review is unequivocally authorized by
statute. While the practice seems to have taken
root and flourished in New Jersey, in the other
states in this group it is used considerably less
often. There is room to doubt, for example,
whether appellate review exists in a meaningful
sense in Pennsylvania where the practice is
based in part on a statute authorizing an appeal
'9 Abbott v. State 256 Ark. 558, 508 S.W.2d 733
(1974).
20 State v. Tuttle, 21 Wis. 2d 147, 124 N.W.2d 9
(1963).
" WIS. STAT. ANN. § 251.09 (1971).
2221 Wis. 2d at 151, 124 N.W. 2d at 11.
23 McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d
512 (1971). See Note, Appellate Review of Sentences in
Wisconsin, 13 Wss. L. REv. 1190 (1971).
24 MUELLER, supra note 9, at 677-687.
1 State v. Johnson, 67 N.J. Super. 414, 170 A.2d
830 (App. Div. 1961); See also State v. Laws, 51 N.J.
494, 242 A.2d 333 (1968).
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by right in all murder convictions26 and has
been limited mainly to sentences imposing the
death penalty. Although there is authority sup-
porting appellate review of other sentences,
27
sentence review appears to be a rarely used
avenue of appeal in that state.
Even the existence of explicit statutory au-
thority is not prima facie proof of the vitality of
sentence review in any jurisdiction. In several
states the remedy is severely limited by statute.
In Florida, sentence appeal is allowed only to
the circuit courts from sentences imposed by
municipal courts. 2 In Oregon, appeal is per-
mitted only from sentences imposed following a
plea of guilty and, since the courts in that state
render indeterminate sentences, the only ques-
tion that can be raised on appeal is the reasona-
bleness of the maximum term.29 In Tennessee,
appeal is permitted only on the question of
whether the sentences for more than one of-
fense ought to be imposed cumulatively or con-
secutively.30 In Hawaii, sentence review is ex-
plicitly authorized by statute, but because the
courts there have no control over the length of
sentences, review is limited to sentences im-
posed for misdemeanors and to the question of
probation or incarceration for felonies.3
1 If
those states in which sentence review is available
on a severely limited basis are omitted from
the list, it would appear that the remedy obtains
in only seventeen states, and only in ten or so of
these does it appear that appellate review of
sentences is practiced as an on-going, well rec-
ognized post-conviction remedy offering rea-
sonable expectations of success. Appellate re-
view of sentences appears to take root and
flourish best in jurisdictions in which it is ex-
plicitly authorized by statute and the function is
given to a special, easily identifiable court.
In some states in which sentence review is
grounded on judicial interpretation of a gen-
eral statute, and in those in which it stems from
an expressed but brief grant of statutory au-
26 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1186-1187 (Purdon
1964).
27 Commonwealth v. Pauls, 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 595,
182 A.2d 261 (1962).
28 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.41 (1974).
29 ORE. REV. STAT. § 138.050 (1975); State v. Gust,
218 Ore. 498, 345 P.2d 808 (1959).
30 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2711 (1975).
31 State v. Kui Ching, 46 Haw. 135, 376 P.2d 379
(1962), State v. Sacoco, 45 Haw. 288, 367 P.2d 11
(1961).
thority, the practice of sentence review is likely
to operate with a minimum number of restric-
tions. Any appellate court which has jurisdic-
tion over the case can review virtually any sen-
tence and can dispose of the case on whatever
basis and by whatever means it chooses. In
jurisdictions where the statutory authority is
more explicit, it is not uncommon for proce-
dures to be carefully governed. In Connecticut,
for example, the statute even requires that the
clerk of court notify the defendant of the right
to appeal his sentence. 32 In some states sentence
review is made the exclusive province of a par-
ticular court, which is often a lower court. In
Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Montana, and New Hampshire, sentences are
reviewable only by a specially created appellate
division of one of the lower courts or by a
special panel of trial judges convened for this
purpose. The ABA's special committee voiced
opposition to the special court plan as an unde-
sirable division of the appellate function, a
hardship on litigants and a hindrance to the
formulation of sentencing policies.u
It is not uncommon for statutes to permit an
appeal only from sentences of a certain dura-
tion. In Alaska, for example, only sentences of
at least one year are appealable, 34 while Colo-
rado only allows defendants to appeal felony
sentences which exceed three years.3 5 Limita-
tions of this sort are thought necessary to pre-
vent the court from being deluged with minor
appeals. Sentences that are mandatory by stat-
ute are, of course, not appealable.
In seven of the states which allow for sen-
tence review, the original sentence can be in-
creased on appeal if the court should find that
the original sentence was overly lenient. In
Alaska the state is permitted to initiate an ap-
peal to have a sentence declared deficient.2 "
Some states-Illinois, Hawaii, Arizona and Ne-
braska-expressly forbid a sentence to be in-
creased on appeal. In Colorado a sentence can
be increased only upon the introduction of new
evidence of aggravation. 37
The right of the state to appeal the leniency
of a sentence is one of the most controversial
32 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-195 (1958).
ABA STANDARDS, supra, note 5, at 33.
34 ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(a) (1972).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-409(2) (1973).
36 ALASKA STAT. §12.55.120(6) (1972).
"7 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-409(3) (1973).
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aspects of appellate review of sentences. A ma-
jority of the committee which formulated the
ABA's guidelines concerning sentence review
rejected the power to increase sentences on the
ground that it would discourage defendants
from challenging sentences they considered ex-
cessive .3 Others argue that only in this way can
the courts be spared a deluge of frivolous ap-
peals against sentencing. The British experi-
ence indicates, however, that when the Crimi-
nal Division of the Court of Appeals was de-
prived of the power to increase sentences in
October, 1966, after more than half a century
of experience with the practice, the ensuing
increase in the number of appeals (which has
since abated) did not hamper the work of the
court. 9 As one commentator concluded,
"When the power to increase sentences existed
in England, it was rarely used, and since it has
been abolished it has rarely been missed. 40
One other feature of appellate review of sen-
tences in the United States deserves special
mention. Seldom is an attempt made by statute
to provide the court with guidelines concerning
the scope or purpose of its review. Colorado, a
rare exception, instructs the reviewing court to
have regard for "the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the public inter-
est, and the manner in which the sentence was
imposed, including the sufficiency and accu-
racy of the information on which it was
based. '41 In most states, however, the courts
must develop their own ideas concerning the
validity of sentences and the purpose of sen-
tence review. Since the sentencing decision is an
inherently difficult one, and since the appellate
courts do not have the first-hand knowledge of
the case that the trial judge is in a position to
acquire, most appellate courts in the United
States -and particularly those that do not spe-
cialize in the review of sentences -are prone to
treat the sentence of the trial court as being
prima facie valid and unreviewable, unless a
clear abuse of discretion can be shown. In their
determination not to "meddle with the sen-
tence" imposed by the exercise of a presumably
sound discretion on the part of the trial judge,
' ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 58.
'9 Meador, The Review of Criminal Sentences in Eng-
land, in ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 144.
40 Thomas, Appellate Review of Sentences and the De-
velopment of Sentencing Policy: The English Experience, 20
ALA. L. REV. 193, 224 (1968).
41 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-409(1) (1973).
the reviewing courts tend to limit their function
to correcting only the most glaring abuses. As a
result, they deprive themselves of their ability
to set sentencing policy or to develop a body of
precedent; and in doing so they discourage
further appeals.
II.
It is difficult to explain why so few states have
chosen to depart from the rule of non-reviewa-
bility of sentences. Reluctance to do so is easy to
find however, and in state after state the appel-
late courts have rejected with little or no expla-
nation the suggestion that they have authority
to review sentences on appeal. In order to lay
the foundation for an effort to identify the sorts
of factors that have served to discourage the
adoption of sentence review in the states, it is
instructive to examine in some detail the expe-
rience of the federal courts with the doctrine of
non-reviewability of sentences.
Before 1891 the circuit courts possessed and
exercised the authority to correct harsh sen-
tences. The Judicature Act of 1879 contained a
provision that "in case of an affirmance of the
judgment of the district court, the circuit court
shall proceed to pronounce final sentence and
to award execution thereon. '4 When the new
appellate courts were created in 1891, this pro-
vision of the old act was omitted, and the omis-
sion was shortly taken to mean that the courts
of appeal no longer had authority to review
sentences. In Freeman v. United States, 43 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
suggestion that it could modify sentences and
explained that earlier decisions modifying sen-
tences, which had been cited as precedent, were
based on the "peculiar language of the third
section of the Act of March 3, 1879."" Since
there was "no such provision in the act creating
the Circuit Court of Appeals" the court con-
cluded that it had been "given only appellate
jurisdiction to review, by appeal or by writ of
error, final decisions in the District Court.
4
5
This conclusion has been shown to be inconsist-
ent with the legislative history of the act,4r but it
41 Judicature Act of 1879, ch. 176, § 1, 20 Stat. 354.
13 243 F. 353 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S.
600 (1919). See also Jackson v. United States, 102 F. 473
(9th Cir. 1900).
41 243 F. at 357.
45Id.
46 See the analysis by Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search
of a Rational Sentence: A Return to the Concept of Appel-
late Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463 (1974).
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has formed the basis of the federal rule of this
point ever since.
47
It should be noted that unlike some state
courts, the federal courts have consistently
avoided finding authority for sentence review
implicit in their own general authority "to af-
firm, modify or reverse the judgment, decree
or order brought before it for review." 48 The
federal courts have steadfastly held that the
remedy for an unduly harsh sentence "must be
afforded by Congress, not byjudicial legislation
under the guise of construction."49 By 1937 the
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit con-
cluded that:
If there is one rule in federal criminal practice
that is firmly established it is that the appellate
court has no control over a sentence which is
within the limits allowed by a statute. 50
In Gore v. United States,51 the United States
Supreme Court was presented with one of its
few opportunities to review a sentence. The
Court noted that it was being "asked to enter
the domain of penology, and more particularly
that tantalizing aspect of it, the proper appor-
tionment of punishment." Noting that "these
are peculiarly questions of legislative policy,"
the Court concluded that it had "no such
power.
5 2
Although firmly established, the doctrine of
non-reviewability has frequently been ques-
tioned. 53 In discussing the question of whether
the imposition of the death penalty in case of
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 1952 was an
abuse of judicial discretion, Judge Jerome
Frank noted both the argument that the power
" See Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950);
Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187 (1895). See also
Hanley v. United States, 183 F. 49 (2d Cir. 1903).
48 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 2, 17 Stat. 197.
'" Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305
(1932).
50 Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th
Cir. 1937).
51 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
521Id. at 393.
11 The most persistent advocate of appellate review
of sentences has been Simon E. Sobeloff, former
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. See, for example, his remarks
in Appellate Review of Sentences: A Symposium at the
Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249, 264 (1962); and his
articles A Recommendation for Appellate Review of Crimi-
nal Sentences, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 2 (1955); and The
Sentence of the Court: Should There Be Appellate Review?
41 A. B. A.J. 13 (1955).
to review sentences formerly exercised by the
circuit courts "had been incorporated by refer-
ence in the 1891 statute setting up the Courts of
Appeal, ' 54 as well as the argument that the
court could review sentences under the author-
ity given to it by 28 U.S.C. §2106 "to affirm,
modify or reverse" a judgment. In the face of
sixty years of established practice, however,
Judge Frank concluded that:
the Supreme Court alone is in a position to hold
that Section 2106 confers authority to reduce a
sentence which is not outside the bounds set by a
valid statute. As matters now stand, this court
properly regards itself as powerless to exercise
its own judgment concerning the alleged sever-
ity of the defendants' sentences. 55
In Smith v. United States,5 6 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in Oklahoma held
that while a fifty-two year sentence for multiple
unaggravated violations of the marijuana and
narcotics statutes was greater than should have
been imposed, the court was without power to
modify the sentence. Chief Judge Murrah
wrote a vigorous dissent, arguing that the court
should assume the authority to review sen-
tences as part of its power to modifyjudgments.
He noted that "no federal court has ever ruled
that the statute does not mean what it plainly
says.""
In addition to these instances in which the
doctrine of non-reviewability has been ques-
tioned, the federal courts have developed a
large body of law which permits the courts to
review the sentencing process for possible viola-
tion of due process. The development of this
line of cases may be regarded in part as a re-
sponse to the inability of the courts to review
the merits of the sentences. In Townsend v.
Burke,58 an early case, the Supreme Court set
aside a sentence on the grounds that it was
based on incomplete information and that erro-
neous inferences had been drawn from that
information by the trial judge. The Townsend
case has been considered as authority for lower
courts to adjudicate complaints concerning the
process by which a sentence has been reached. 59
" United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 n.
25 (2d Cir. 1952).
55 195 F.2d at 606-607.
5 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959).517 Id. at 469.
58 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
" Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 46, at 474.
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Recently, for instance, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit" vacated a sentence and
remanded a case for resentencing because it did
not appear that the judge had given proper
consideration to certain alternative methods of
disposing of the case. Similarly, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit6' vacated a sen-
tence because the presentence report contained
allegations concerning the defendant's past ac-
tivities that were speculative and unsupported
by factual evidence .62 Another exception to the
doctrine of non-reviewability occurs in cases
involving an offense for which no maximum
penalty has been prescribed by statute (e.g.,
criminal contempt), where the absence of limi-
tations on the sentencing power gives the ap-
pellate courts "a special responsibility for de-
terming that the power is not abused...63
There are at least two instances in which the
appellate courts have undertaken to review sen-
tences directly, regardless of the status of their
authority to do so. In United States v. Wiley,6 4 the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
manded a case in which one defendant, who
had pleaded not guilty, had been given a more
severe sentence than his accomplices, who had
pleaded guilty. When the same sentence was
reimposed, the court set aside the sentence and
again remanded the case on the ground that
the district court had "without any justification
arbitrarily singled out a minor defendant for
the imposition of a more severe sentence than
that imposed upon the co-defendants. ' 65 Since
the district court had failed to heed the "gentle
intimations" of the previous remand, the Court
of Appeals felt that it had "no alternative but to
6o United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495 (4th Cir.
1971).
6 United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.
1971).
62 Other cases in this series come even closer to
examining the merits of the sentence itself. See
United States v. Trevino, 490 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, 476 F.2d 1251
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Walker, 469 F.2d 1377
(1st Cir. 1972). All of these cases are analyzed in Kutak
& Gottschalk, supra note 46.
63 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958).
64 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960). See also Comment,
Present Limitations on Appellate Review of Sentencing, 58
IOWA L. REV. 469 (1972); Comment, Appellate Re-
view of Sentences: A Survey, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 221
(1972).
15 278 F.2d at 503.
exercise its supervisory power over the admin-
istration ofjustice in the lower federal courts by
setting aside the sentence of the District
Court."66 In response the district court reim-
posed the same sentence, but this time sus-
pended its execution. In United States v. Dan-
iels67 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
remanded the sentence of a draft evader for
reconsideration because the sentencing judge
admitted that the five-year sentence was dic-
tated solely by his long standing personal policy
of always sentencing draft evaders to five years.
When he refused to alter the sentence on re-
mand, the Court of Appeals vacated the sen-
tence, and ordered the trial court to place the
defendant on probation.
The latest statement concerning the federal
doctrine of non-reviewability of sentences was
written in 1974 by the Supreme Court in Dor-
szynski v. United States.6s Although the issue of
sentence review was never argued by counsel in
this case, in the course of the majority opinion
Chief Justice Burger declared that there is no
authority for appellate review of sentences in
the federal judicial system. This statement may
be interpreted as a pointed reminder addressed
to the judges of the federal courts of appeal.
The expectation that cases like Wiley and Daniels
would soon lead to the establishment of a firm
judicial policy permitting sentence review has
presumably been laid to rest by the Chief Jus-
tice's remark in Dorszynski. The hopes of the
proponents of sentence review in the federal
courts are now focused on the sentence review
provision of the pending revision of the crimi-
nal code.6 9 This provision enjoys wide support,
even though its adoption is presently being de-
layed by the controversial nature of some of the
other provisions of the bill.
Although none of the states has developed as
voluminous a body of law concerning the non-
reviewability of sentences as exists in the federal
courts, there is clearly a good deal of reluctance
to depart from the common law rule of non-
reviewability, either by means of statute or by
judicial interpretation. The height of judicial
reluctance was probably reached in Florida,
where the courts declined to accept two sepa-
66 Id. at 503-04.
67 429 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1970), remanded with in-
structions, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971).
68 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
69 S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3721-3726 (1975).
(Vol. 68
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES
rate and explicit statutory authorizations to re-
view excessive sentences, interpreting one stat-
ute as encompassing only illegal sentences, and
the other as being insufficiently precise. 70 More
recently, the Supreme Court of Arkansas inter-
preted an attempt by the state legislature to vest
the court with the authority to reduce excessive
sentences as an unconstitutional infringement
upon the governor's clemency powers.
71
Criminal defendants are not a politically in-
fluential group in anyjurisdiction, and that fact
alone undoubtedly goes a long way toward ex-
plaining why the idea of sentence review is
seldom raised in the state legislatures. Only in
relatively recent years have influential groups
such as bar associations attempted to press for
appellate sentence review before state legisla-
tures and Congress. What is especially unclear
is why more appellate judges who have been
confronted with the problems created by the
lack of this power have not sought to establish it
based on the statutory authority at hand. This is
an important question that the ABA's Commit-
tee on Standards poses but does not attempt to
answer. The committee observed:
It is no surprise, of course, to see appellate
courts insisting upon statutory authority before
exercising such power. What is not so clear,
however, and what must await an examination
of the history of sentence review ... is why the
courts have been so reluctant to construe gen-
eral authority to review criminal judgments as
including authority over the sentences.72
Without hazarding a definitive answer to this
question, it is possible to identify a number of
factors that conceivably have been influential
in discouraging the courts from interpreting
existing authority to permit sentence appeals.
7 3
First, the courts have shown a tendency to ac-
cept the idea that the appropriateness of a sen-
tence is not really a proper question for the
judiciary. The doctrine of non-reviewability has
70 Infante v. State, 197 So. 2d 542 (Dist. Ct. App.
Fla. 1967); Florida Real Estate Comm. v. Rogers, 176
So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1965).
71 Abbott v. State, 256 Ark. 558, 563, 508 S.W.2d
733, 736 (1974); cf. People v. Odle, 37 Cal. 2d 52, 230
P.2d 345 (1951).
72 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 14.
73 Cf. Walsh, Appellate Review of Sentences: A Sympo-
sium at the Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, 32, F.R.D. 249, 276
(1962).
been said to be a product of classical penologi-
cal thinking which stressed the ability of the
legislature to find an appropriate punishment
to fit every crime and de-emphasized the role of
the individual judge in the formulation of par-
ticular punishments.7 4 An acceptence of this
idea can be found, for example, in the state-
ment of the United States Supreme Court in
Gore v. United States75 that sentencing questions
"are peculiarly questions of legislative policy."
The idea is also reflected in the willingness of
the federal courts of appeal to review the exer-
cise of a trial judge's discretion in imposing a
sentence for an offense for which no maximum
penalty has been prescribed by statute.76 The
same concern for the proper definition of the
judicial function can be seen in the decisions of
the courts holding that an appeal of an alleg-
edly excessive sentence is in the nature of a plea
for clemency, which is most appropriately han-
dled by the executive.
77
Second, even admitting the necessity ofjudi-
cial involvement in the process of devising ap-
propriate criminal sanctions in individual cases,
appellate courts have often been reluctant to
admit that this is their proper function, and
they have shown great respect for the sentenc-
ing discretion exercised by lower court judges.
As one commentator suggested, "the sentenc-
ingjudge is in a superior position because of his
personal involvement in the transaction to' de-
termine the most appropriate type and degree
of penal sanction."78 There is some evidence
that lower court judges resent the suggestion
that their sentencing discretion ought to be sub-
ject to review on appeal, 79 and given the contin-
uing relationship that exists between lower
court judges and the judges to whom their deci-
sions are usually appealed, this factor may very
well be the primary one operating to discourage
the appellate courts from adopting sentence
review.
Third, the fear that appellate review of sen-
tences would expose already overcrowded
" Mueller & Le Poole, supra note 2, at 411.
75 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
76 See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165,
188 (1958).
77 Abbott v. State, 256 Ark. 558, 563, 508 S.W.2d
733, 736 (1974); People v. Odle, 37 Cal. 2d 52, 58
(1951).
" Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review
of Sentencing, 25 RUTGERS L. Rzv. 207, 216 (1971).
7' There are intimations to this effect, for instance,
in the remarks of Walsh, supra note 73, at 276.
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dockets to a deluge of additional appeals has
perhaps played a part in discouraging the
courts from establishing this practice for them-
selves. This might well have been an operative
factor in the mind of Chief Justice Burger
when, in Dorszynski, he reminded lower federal
judges that there is no appeal of sentences in
the federal courts. Like most other appellate
courts today, the United States Supreme Court
does not wish to induce a drastic increase in its
workload.
Fourth, it is argued by the opponents of sen-
tence review that appellate review of sentences
would establish a line of "acceptable sentences"
for given criminal situations, and would dis-
courage trial judges for thinking for them-
selves.8 0 Similarly, it is sometimes said that sen-
tence review would expose the appellate courts
to the corrupting influence of the sort of extral-
egal and emotional arguments that are involved
in the process of arriving at a correct sen-
tence.8" Although these latter two arguments
are perhaps not highly plausible as factors that
have actually induced appellate judges not to
adopt sentence review, they deserve mention as
sources for testable hypotheses concerning the
actual operation of sentence review.
Although there is not much evidence that
reluctant courts have been willing to heed
countervailing arguments, the proponents of
sentence review have developed answers to all
of the foregoing concerns. 82 They argue, for
instance, that intervention by the executive oc-
curs too seldom to serve as a substitute for
sentence review as an established appellate
practice. The fear of suddenly overcrowded
dockets is not borne out, it is argued, by the
experience of those states which have adopted
sentence review. They argue that the inability
to review sentences directly has led some courts
to attempt to do justice in individual cases by
adjudicating them on some other grounds. In
short, the lack of sentence review does not
spare the court's docket; it only obscures the
real issue in some cases. To the argument con-
cerning the primacy of the trial judge's discre-
tion in formulating a sentence, they respond
that the argument loses much of its force when
it is realized that in all jurisdictions the vast
80Id. at 281-82.
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 46, at
494.
majority of cases are disposed of by guilty pleas.
In these cases the trial judge is furnished with
little or no opportunity for first hand observa-
tion of the defendant. Moreover, there are
numerous instances in which judges have
either not used their discretion and imposed
sentences by reference solely to a pre-deter-
mined policy,8 or in which they have abused it
by allowing improper factors to influence their
decisions. To the argument that sentence re-
view would result in the development of "price
tags" for almost every criminal situation which
would be mindlessly applied by sentencing
judges, the advocates of sentence review re-
spond that their goal is not uniformity of sen-
tences but rather a "uniformly fair and equita-
ble approach" to sentencing. s4 Finally, they ar-
gue that there is no reason to believe that appel-
late courts cannot learn to survive an encounter
with the raw facts and emotionalism involved in
sentencing and emerge with their capacity for
accurate and dispassionate evaluation of the
case intact.
There is not much evidence that these coun-
tervailing arguments have actually had much
effect in changing the minds of reluctant
courts. The future of appellate review of sen-
tences is likely to depend more on the validity
of the positive arguments that can be made in
favor of this practice.
III.
The purposes of sentence review have been
summarized by the ABA's Advisory Committee
on Sentencing and Review as follows:
(1) to correct the sentence which is excessive in
length, having regard to the nature of the of-
fense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest;
(2) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender
by affording him an opportunity to assert griev-
ances he may have regarding his sentence;
(3) to promote respect for law by correcting
abuses of the sentencing power and by increas-
ing the fairness of the sentencing process; and
(4) to promote the development and application
83 See, e.g., United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652
(5th Cir. 1974); Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139
(8th Cir. 1973); United States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d
1403 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Daniels, 446
F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Wiley, 278
F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960). These cases are cited by
Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 46, at n. 158.
84 See Sobeloff, sura note 53, at 273.
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of criteria for sentencing which are both rational
and just.""
There is little room for doubt that sentence
review is capable of directly accomplishing
some of its stated goals. It is an effective means,
for example, of combating the clearly excessive
sentence, such as the fifty-two year sentence for
an unaggravated marijuana and narcotics con-
viction given to a youthful first-time offender
which a frustrated federal court of appeals
let stand because it could not legally do other-
wise. 6
Sentence review can also be an effective
means of combating some of the disparity
found among sentences. A typical example is
furnished by People v. Steg,17 where three de-
fendants pleaded guilty and were convicted of
an armed robbery. One of the defendants, who
admitted to being the instigator of the crime,
was sentenced to two-to-ten years. Later, an-
other judge sentenced each of his accomplices
to the substantially greater terms of five-to-
twenty years imprisonment. Such disparities,
particularly when sentences are imposed by dif-
ferent judges for the same or similar crimes,
are not at all uncommon. In most states, sent-
encingjudges have little or no way to determine
how other judges are responding to similar
sentencing situations. The ABA Committee on
Standards saw a considerable need for develop-
ing a sentence review procedure, since the dis-
parity in sentences is a major source of bitter-
ness and disillusionment among prisoners and
a serious impediment to rehabilitation.88
Debate concerning the purposes of sentence
review centers mainly on the ability of the
courts to develop sentencing criteria. The
courts have proven themselves very capable
of making policy concerning the integrity of
the sentencing process, yet serious doubts
have been expressed about their ability to de-
velop policies concerning the substance of sen-
tences.89 A survey of decisions reviewing sen-
tences imposed in narcotics cases, for example,
would disclose that the courts have considered
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 21.
Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir.
1959).
87 69 I1. App. 2d 188, 215 N.E.2d 854 (1966).
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 25-26.
89 Comment, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing
Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L. REV.
1453 (1960).
as particularly relevant such factors as the de-
fendant's criminal record, his previous involve-
ment with the offense, his family background,
age, educational record, employment record,
and ability to change. 0 Nonetheless, it is diffi-
cult to formulate a systematic idea of the rela-
tive weight given to these factors in any particu-
larjurisdiction. In part this is due to the paucity
of decisions in which sentences were reviewed
and to the frequent-and perhaps characteris-
tic- failure of the courts to discuss the theoreti-
cal bases that underly their decision to uphold
or to reverse a sentence. The extent to which
judges visualize this as a part of their review
function has yet to be established.9 1 As a result,
lower courts are not furnished with precedents
useful in formulating sentences. The ability of
the appellate courts to develop sentencing poli-
cies for the guidance of the lower courts is a
crucial element in the case favoring sentence
review, and it is this precise concern which
makes sentence review of particular relevance
to students of the judicial process.
In conducting research into this problem, it is
important to bear in mind that there are ac-
tually several policy-making levels involved in
the sentencing process. Modern penology rec-
ognizes four general aims of sentencing: (1)
retribution, (2) general deterrence, (3) individ-
ual deterrence, or isolation of the offender and
(4) rehabilitation, and a decision must be made
concerning which of these goals are to be
achieved by the sentence. 92 The nature of the
crime will figure as a large factor, along with
the personal characteristics of the offender and
the circumstances of the particular offense. If
the effectiveness of the courts in formulating
sentencing policies is to be properly analyzed,
the policy-making function of the courts in this
area must be viewed with regard to each of the
four aims of sentencing.
The literature suggests that courts are better
at pursuing some goals than others, and diffi-
culties may differ from one stage of policy-
making to another. In a 1937 detailed analysis
of sentence review decisions, Professor Living-
ston Hall found that the courts had proved
o See 45 A.L.R.3d 812.
91 See generally Halperin, Appellate Review of Sentenc-
ing in Illinois-Reality or Illusion, 55 ILL. BAR Ass'N J.
301 (1966).




themselves adept at making the primary deci-
sion between the alternative aims of sentenc-
ing.93 His research uncovered a discernible pat-
tern of sentencing policies formulated in terms
of the nature of the crimes: first, crimes against
the person were punished primarily to achieve
retribution. Second, in punishing crimes
against property, the courts were chiefly inter-
ested in preventing a repetition of the crime. As
a result, they were receptive to factors tending
toward mitigation or indicative of the defend-
ant's capacity for change. Rehabilitation was
most frequently practiced with regard to these
crimes. Finally, crimes not involving personal
harm or damage to property, such as liquor
violations, were punished to achieve general
deterrence. Mitigating factors tended to be ig-
nored, and the sentence was used to affirm the
values implicit in the statute.
The same adeptness at making the primary
policy decision is presumed by a 1968 recom-
mendation of the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice, which urged judges to take account of
four groups of drug offenders whose crimes
differed in seriousness: (1) smuggling or sale of
large quantities of narcotics; (2) smuggling or
sale of small quantities of narcotics; (3) posses-
sion without intent to sell; (4) marijuana of-
fenses. 9
4
Whether the courts are equally adept at for-
mulating policies to implement their initial pol-
icy decision may well be another question.
While it may be relatively easy to formulate
guidelines concerning the precise manner of
implementing the goal of retribution or deter-
rence, it seems that courts do not succeed
nearly as well in formulating guidelines to
93 Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal: I,
37 COLUM. L. REV. 521, 529-547 (1937).
" PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 513 (1968).
achieve rehabilitation. Here they may encoun-
ter the frontiers of their judicial expertise.
There are those who contend in fact that this is
a problem that necessarily affects any attempt
to implement initial sentencing policies. "The
utter failure to develop a system of precedents
for sentence reduction both in the United
States and in England," Lester Orfield con-
tends, "is very likely strong evidence that the
problem is not soluble by an appellate court."
Orfield explains:
Appellate courts as well as trial courts are wholly
unsuited by training and methods of work to
pass on the propriety of sentences. What the
appellate courts are eminently fitted for is to
pass on the correctness of the conviction of the
defendant. It is their peculiar province to en-
force compliance with the rules of substantive
law and procedure. The problem of sentencing
involves wholly different considerations. The
question no longer is, is the defendant guilty or
innocent? It is, what shall be done with him?95
Given the momentum that sentence review
seems to have gathered in recent years, argu-
ments like this one against the practice will
probably be viewed as premature. As long as
penology remains within the orbit of the law it
will be argued that "it is obviously the duty of
the appellate courts to see to it that the law is
properly served." 96 The continued growth of
this avenue of appeal depends largely on the
passage of additional statutes explicitly author-
izing sentence review and a willingness on the
part of the appellate courts to review the exer-
cise of the trial judge's discretion in formulating
sentences. The continued growth of this prac-
tice will furnish students of the judicial process
with an increasing fund of data with which to
participate in the evaluation of the courts' role
in applying penology on appeal.
95 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA
117-18 (1939).
" Mueller, supra note 2, at 686.
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